

MATTS: University of Delft, 2018


**Dynamical queueing, dynamical route choice,
responsive traffic control and control systems
which maximise network throughput**

Michael J. Smith, Takamasa Iryo, Richard
Mounce, Marco Rinaldi, and Francesco Viti


Universities:

York, Kobe, Aberdeen, Luxembourg


Dynamical queueing




Dynamical queueing




Dynamical queueing




Dynamical queueing




Dynamical queueing




Dynamical queueing




Dynamical queueing




Dynamical queueing




Dynamical queueing




SMALL Network




SMALL Network is not unrealistic




SMALL Network is not unrealistic




SMALL Network is not unrealistic




SMALL Network is not unrealistic




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SMALL Network is not unrealistic



Summary

The talk considers:

- A spatial queueing model (representing the space taken up by queues)*
- Traffic signal control and route choice.*
- Throughput maximising control when demand exceeds capacity*

- P0 control and pricing results for the City of York.*

Summary

The talk considers:

- *A spatial queueing model (representing the space taken up by queues)*
DONE
- *Traffic signal control and route choice.*
- *Throughput maximising control when demand exceeds capacity*
- *P0 control and pricing results for the City of York.*

AIM

*TO REDUCE CONGESTION /
POLLUTION IN CITIES*

AIM

*TO REDUCE CONGESTION /
POLLUTION IN CITIES*

IN PART AUTOMATICALLY


Previous Work

Modelling Signal Control and Route Choice:


Allsop, Dickson, Gartner, Akcelik, Maher, Van Vliet, Van Vuren, Smith, Van Zuylen, Meneguzzer, Gentile, Noekel, Taale, Cantarella, Mounce, Watling, Ke Han, Himpe, Viti, Schlaich, Haupt, Tampere, Huang, Rinaldi,




Traffic Control and Route Choice



NETWORK WITH ROUTE AND GREEN-TIME CHOICES



NETWORK WITH ROUTE AND GREEN-TIME CHOICES



Control and Route-flow Variables

Controls:

Green-time vector \mathbf{g} :


$$g_1 + g_2 = 1.$$

Route-flows:


Route-flow vector \mathbf{X} ;

$$X_1 + X_2 = \text{given steady demand } T.$$

SMALL Network




P0: Choose greens so \mathbf{b} is “normal” to S .




P0: Choose greens so \mathbf{b} is “normal” to S .


$$s_1 b_1 = s_2 b_2$$



STANDARD POLICIES HALVE THE CAPACITY OF THIS NETWORK



NETWORK WITH ROUTE AND GREEN-TIME CHOICES



Equilibrium flow and P_0 green-time

EXACT P_0 Control Policy:


green-time \mathbf{g} satisfies $s_1 b_1 = s_2 b_2$

EXACT route-choice equilibrium:

route-flow \mathbf{X} satisfies $C_1 + b_1 = C_2 + b_2$

What if these conditions do not hold?


ROUTE AND GREEN-TIME SWAPS



ROUTE AND GREEN-TIME SWAPS

Travel cost along route 1 = $C_1 + b_1$


Travel cost along route 2 = $C_2 + b_2$



ROUTE AND GREEN-TIME SWAPS

Travel cost along route 1 = $C_1 + b_1$


Travel cost along route 2 = $C_2 + b_2$



ROUTE AND GREEN-TIME SWAPS

Pressure on stage 1 = $s_1 b_1$


Pressure on stage 2 = $s_2 b_2$




ROUTE AND GREEN-TIME SWAPS

$[C_1 + b_1] - [C_2 + b_2]$
controls black arrow


$s_1 b_1 - s_2 b_2$
controls green arrow




*** *HOPE: Stability* ***




***** HOPE: Stability *****




***** HOPE: Stability *****




*** *HOPE: Stability* ***




*** *HOPE: Stability* ***



*** *HOPE: Stability* ***



~~HOPE:~~ WITH P_0 MANY DYNAMICAL
MODELS HAVE STABILITY!!! ✓



Other policies?


STABLE WITH STANDARD POLICIES ???


Other policies?

STABLE WITH STANDARD POLICIES ???


NO!


***CONTROL WHICH
MAXIMISES
THROUGHPUT
Even when demand
exceeds capacity***








MAXIMUM FLOW = $s/2$














SUMMARY

*P0 modified maximises
throughput of ONE network even
when demand exceeds capacity*

SUMMARY

*P0 modified maximises
throughput of ONE network even
when demand exceeds capacity*

Further work: Generalise!!!

QUESTIONS?

Other related work


Le, T., Kovacs, P., Walton, N., Vu, H. L., Andrew, L. H., Hoogendoorn, S. P. 2015. Decentralised Signal Control for Urban Road Networks. *Transportation Research Part C*, 58, 431-450. (Proportional Control Policy)

Peter Kovacs, Tung Le, Rudesindo Nunez-Queija, Hai L. Vu, Neil Walton, Proportional green time scheduling for traffic lights.


YORK RESULTS

These were obtained by Mustapha Ghali using a dynamic equilibrium program called CONTRAM (used to be supported by the Transport and Road Research Laboratory in the UK)


CONTRAM RESULTS FOR THE YORK NETWORK




CONTRAM RESULTS FOR THE YORK NETWORK




CONTRAM RESULTS FOR THE YORK NETWORK




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


CONTRAM RESULTS FOR THE YORK NETWORK




CONTRAM RESULTS FOR THE YORK NETWORK

% CHANGE IN TOTAL QUEUEING DELAY




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
Questions?

$$P_0: s_1 b_1 = s_2 b_2$$




$$P_0: s_1 b_1 = s_2 b_2$$

$$P_0 \text{ with prices: } s_1 p_1 = s_2 p_2$$




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
$$P_0: s_1 b_1 = s_2 b_2$$

P_0 with prices: $s_1 p_1 = s_2 p_2$ **FEASIBLE EQM**




$P_0: s_1 b_1 = s_2 b_2$ **NO FEASIBLE EQM**

P_0 with prices: $s_1 p_1 = s_2 p_2$ **FEASIBLE EQM**




$P_0: s_1 b_1 = s_2 b_2$ **NO FEASIBLE EQM**

P_0 with prices: $s_1 p_1 = s_2 p_2$ **FEASIBLE EQM**




$P_0: s_1 b_1 = s_2 b_2$ **NO FEASIBLE EQM**

P_0 with prices: $s_1 p_1 = s_2 p_2$ **FEASIBLE EQM**



$$P_0: s_1 b_1 = s_2 b_2$$

$$P_0 \text{ with prices: } s_1 p_1 = s_2 p_2$$



Questions?