Evaluation of air transportation network resilience using adaptive capacity

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662 M Passengers

Air transportation is one of major transport modes to carry both passengers and freight.

Source
Federal Aviation Administration Statistics in 2014

8.5 Million flights

20,305 M lbs

A single failure of ATN can bring a huge socio-economic impact.

In 2010

Iceland

Eyjafjallajokull

Volcano Eruption

Volcanic ash covered north Europe
During the One week
Cancelled 60 thousands flights
Economic Loss 170 M dollars







Photo taken by ©lafur Eggertsson


Reference: BBC News, 16 April 2010 and Source from Met Office


ATN is a well-known scale-free network, which is robust to random hazard but vulnerable to targeted attack

- A random hazard has a small chance of removing a hig h-degree node, but an informed agent will target highe st-degree node (Albert et al. 2000)
- So it has the inherent hazard tolerance of the network (Barabasi and Oltvai 2004)









Definition of Resilience

 The ability of a system to return to a stable state following a strong perturbation caused by failure, disaster or attack

C. S. Holling, "Engineering resilience versus ecological resilience," Eng. within Ecol. constraints, no. 1996, pp. 31-43, 1996


 Ability to withstand and stay operational at the required level of safety during the impact of a given disruptive event

M. Zanin and F. Lillo, "Modelling the air transport with complex networks: A short review," *Eur. Phys. J. Spec. Top.*, pp. 1–28, 2013.




- Adaptive capacity is the ability or potential of a system to respond successfully to variabil ity and change, and includes adjustments in both behavior and in resources and technolo gies.
- The presence of adaptive capacity has been shown to be a necessary condition for the de sign and implementation of effective adaptation strategies so as to reduce the likelihood and the magnitude of harmful outcomes resulting from the change. (Brooks and Adger, 2 005)

Resilience of system



An infrastructure usually remain some buffer to prepare the change of demand

Resilience of system: What if supply changes?



Absorptive capacity: the ability of the system to absorb the disruptive event

Adaptive capacity: the degree to which the system is capable of self-organization for recovery of system performance levels Restorative capacity: the ability of the system to recover/be repaired

Ref. A framework for Assessing the Resilience of Infrastructure and Economic Systems, Eric D. Vugrin et al., 2010

The network ability to maintain a certain level of performance is essential as to provide sufficient an d satisfactory service, so this paper will evaluate the network resilience to a perturbation.

Goal of this paper

1. Suggest to measure 'adaptive capacity' for evaluating network resilience

- System's performance change(increased travel time, economic loss) is hard to measur
 e although it contains effect of short-term recovery
- We regard the resilience is to sustain a target performance level when a perturbation disturbs the network, and is come from the replacing capability of its remained part of f the system

2. Identify less resilient part of system in ATN

- Adaptive capacity index help us to identify less resilient part of the system
- Identify Previous studies focused on the vulnerability by measuring impact of each no de/link

Air Transportation Network

Network Structure

Node : Airport

Edge: Air route in schedule

Agent : Air flight

Weight : Scheduled flights

Characteristic

- Scale-free network which has a few hub airports
- Spatial network where the nodes are located in physical space
- With nodes which have a capacity to function of a system
- With low cost of link connection


Related researches

- •A. Barrat, M. Barthélemy, R. Pastor-Satorras, and A. Vespignani, "The architecture of complex weighted networks.," Proc. Natl. Acad. Sci. U. S. A., vol. 101, no. 11, pp. 3747–52, Mar. 2004.
- •R. Guimerà, S. Mossa, A. Turtschi, and L. A. N. Amaral, "The worldwide air transportation network: Anomalous centrality, community structure, and cities' global roles.," Proc. Natl. Acad. Sci. U. S. A., vol. 102, no. 22, pp. 7794–9, May 2005.
- •S. M. Wilkinson, S. Dunn, and S. Ma, "The vulnerability of the European air traffic network to spatial hazards," Nat. Hazards, vol. 60, no. 3, pp. 1027–1036, 2012.
- •M. Janić, "Modelling the resilience, friability and costs of an air transport network affected by a large-scale disruptive event," Transp. Res. Part A Policy Pract., vol. 71, pp. 1–16, 2015.
- •E. K. Morlok and D. J. Chang, "Measuring capacity flexibility of a transportation system," Transp. Res. Part A Policy Pract., vol. 38, no. 6, pp. 405–420, Jul. 2004.
- •M. Zanin and F. Lillo, "Modelling the air transport with complex networks: A short review," Eur. Phys. J. Spec. Top., pp. 1–28, 2013.

Simulation


- A weighted, undirected graph with nodes(airports) and links(air routes)
- Data: Air transportation statistics from Federal Aviation Administration in United States, w here has 296 primary airports and 9,273 connections in 2014
- Node(Airports): State, FAA code, Enplanement, Geo-location, Capacity based on condition
- Link(Air routes): Origin, Destination, Departure time, Arrival time
 Link exists if there is at least one flight departing or arriving to the node
- Weight(Flights): Number of flights departing or arriving to the airport per hour

 Using data of hourly average in July 2014 (On Time data of July 2014, FAA)



Simulation

Key concept: the ability of a network in which an attacked node can be e replaced by other adjacent nodes



Simulation

In initial state: the system is in its stable condition in which each node functions lo wer than its capacity. So congestion does not occur.



A disruptive event occurs and brings **a failure of node**. Simulation removes the node from the system and then connected links become disabled.



Changing not only network topology but also balance of capacity and flow, the syste m redistributes the failed node's function to adjacent nodes to replace it.



Resilient case:


If other nodes have enough margin to handle the redistributed loads, the net work is still capable of performing with level of initial state

Less resilient case:

But the load exceeds remaining margin, it brings about a large drop of network performance and a network failure

Type of damages

- 1. Single: a point hazard
 - Error, strike, accident
- 2. Simultaneous: a serial/sequential attack
 - weather(spatial damage), terror attack(order of importance)



R. Albert, H. Jeong, and A. Barabási, "Error and attack tolerance of complex n etworks," *Nature*, vol. 406, no. July, 2000




Fig. 6 Comparison of network vulnerability for the EATN and our three synthetic networks, showing $\bf a$ the impact of airport closure on air route operations; $\bf b$ the influence of airspace closure on air route operations; $\bf c$ the reduction in MCS due to airport closures; and $\bf d$ the influence of airspace closure on MCS

S. M. Wilkinson, S. Dunn, and S. Ma, "The vulnerability of the European air traffic network to sp atial hazards," Nat. Hazards, vol. 60, no. 3, pp. 1027–1036, 2012

Index

- The index of adaptive capacity to measure the network resilience
 : How the network can react to the shock and divide work load
- Under a single failure

Index


- The index of adaptive capacity to measure the network resilience
 : How the network can react to the shock and divide work load
- Under a simultaneous attack

Remaining Adaptive Capacity

- How much extra work load the network can handle
- The ratio of remaining margin to initial margin of the n etwork

Alpha Index


- The lines reach their bottom at different x-axis, which we call alpha zero
- Alpha zero (α_0) is the fraction of nodes at which the ne twork cannot afford to absorb the extra load
- It give us better understating of network's fragility



Air Transportation Network Resilience Under a Single Failure (Core Airports)

Degree of Adaptation


- Depending of the time, the required number of alternative airports are chang ed and so that the degree of adaptation varies by time.
- Max. 5 to Min. 0




Air Transportation Network Resilience Under a Single Failure (Core Airports)

Radius of Adaptation Area

- The radius of adaptation area varies by each airport rather than by time
- It may be depend on sub-network's topology




Air Transportation Network Resilience Under a Single Failure (Core Airports)




Air Transportation Network Resilience Under a Single Failure (Core Airports)

- Considering effect of weights

Average detoured distance




Total detoured distance of all rescheduled flights



By their definition, the radius index and unit cost of ada ptation / the traffic volume and total cost of adaptation are closely related

Then, we can identify outliers over the regression line

RANK				
1	ORD	DUT	DUT	ATL
2	ATL	FAI	FAI	ORD
3	DEN	BRW	BRW	DEN
4	DFW	SCC	SCC	DFW
5	EWR	OTZ	OTZ	CLT



Correlation between radius of adaptation area and unit cost of adaptation (left), traffic and total cost of adaptation(right)


By sub regions

FAA categorized airports into 9 regions

Our index can identify vulnerable and resilient region c ompared to the average of USA.


180 -								
	Alaskan							
(salim 150 -								
Unit cost of alternative route (miles)								
native		Central ●						
of alter			South	hwest				
t cost o		Northwest •	Mountain Souther					
J. 90 -	• NewEngland	West	Grea tern Pacific ●	t Lakes				
						Eastern •		
60 -	1.0	1.1	1.2 Degree of	1 f replacing	node	1.4	1.5	5

REGION				
Alaskan	1.04	180.7	178.9	819.8
Central	1.11	130.8	125.7	790.5
Eastern	1.40	69.8	65.2	1180.3
Great Lakes	1.22	96.4	92.8	1200.5
New England	1.00	80.2	80.2	318.3
Northwest Mountain	1.15	102.6	98.2	1020.6
Southern	1.20	95.2	92.9	1931.2
Southwest	1.23	115.0	109.5	1242.4
Western Pacific	1.17	87.8	82.8	1149.6
USA	1.20	102.1	98.3	1212.2




- Attack a node one by one until all nodes are extracted (percolation)
- Comparison of random failure and targeted attack
- Random attack result come from average of 100 repeats

Targeted attack in order of the importance of node




- Attack a node one by one until all nodes are extracted (percolation)
- Comparison of random failure and targeted attack
- Random attack result come from average of 100 repeats



Region	$\alpha_{0.5}$	α_0	Index of adaptive capacity
USA	0.13	0.52	0.48
Alaskan	0.36	0.86	0.88
Central	0.22	0.83	0.66
Eastern	0.16	0.4	0.51
Great Lakes	0.12	0.59	0.50
New England	0.25	0.92	0.71
Northwest Mountain	0.13	0.71	0.56
Southern	0.13	0.45	0.46
Southwest	0.16	0.55	0.48
Western Pacific	0.15	0.43	0.48

Figure 5 Regional sub-network's replacing capability against node removals under percolation attack. Each region has different pro file showing diverse slopes. USA whole network's profile is represented as black line to compare with.



Fraction of removed nodes

4. Conclusion

- This paper introduced the new index to quantify the resilience of networks from a persp ective of adaptive capacity
- Adaptive capacity can capture a load factor of undesired hazard in terms of 1) required n
 umber of nodes to maintain targeted performance level 2) furthermost distance to deto
 ur 3) average detoured distance 4) total detoured distance
- Identified less resilient airports and sub-regions are needed further study, what are the f actors to make them vulnerable. But we found a clue that network topology and traffics are closely related to their resilience.

Application


- Help to make priority of where the most need gov.'s care
- Evaluate effective strategies to increase network resilience:
 Increasing capacity of an airport, Constructing alternative airport to share burden, Reloca ting(rescheduling) flight and so on.

Thank you for listening

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Appendix.

To evaluate vulnerability of the system, researchers measure the impact of a disruptive event



D. M. Scott, D. C. Novak, L. Aultman-Hall, and F. Guo, "Network Robustness Index: A new method for identifying critical links and evaluating the performance of transportation networks," *J. Transp. Geogr.*, vol. 14, no. 3, pp. 215–227, May 2006